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1 | (Time Noted: 2:55 p.m.)

THE COURT CLERK: Your Honor, that brings us to the last matter from the 2:30 calendar, the case of Blair Chintella. We have Comcast's motion for relief from stay and annulment.

(Brief pause)

THE COURT: Counsel?

MR. ANDERSON: May it please the Court, my name is Carl Anderson, along with Michael Goldman. We represent Movant, Comcast Cable Communications Management, LLC.

We are here before the Court today on Comcast's motion for relief from the automatic stay, and for annulment.

We are here to answer essentially two questions, Your Honor: Whether Comcast's motion for attorneys' fees in the District Court is exempt under Section 362(b)(4), and if it's not exempt, whether the Court should grant relief from the stay, the Section 362 stay.

Comcast requested entry of an order confirming the automatic stay does not apply to its motion for attorneys' fees in the District Court, wherein, in the alternative, respectfully requested the Court enter an order annulling the stay or otherwise modifying or granting relief from the stay to the extent necessary to permit the sanctions motion, the attorneys' fees motion, to be adjudicated by the District Court.



1	And Comcast moves pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(4)
2	for such relief.
3	We filed a motion for sanctions under 28 U.S.C.
4	1927 in the District Court, as a result of the service of the
5	three subpoenas on Comcast in a case where Comcast is a non-
6	party.
7	And if it's all right with the Court, I did a
8	short chronology which does not include everything on the
9	docket in the District Court, but I thought it might help the
10	Court keep things straight. If that's all right, may I
11	approach and
12	THE COURT: I assume the opposing counsel has seen
13	that? And I will just say for everyone's edification, I have
14	looked at the District Court docket, and so I
15	MR. CHINTELLA: I'm sorry, you
16	THE COURT: I have looked at the District Court
17	docket.
18	MR. ANDERSON: Okay, so do
19	THE COURT: I'd be happy to see that, but I have
20	at least scrolled through it.
21	MR. ANDERSON: And the highlighted items are the
22	items that were filed in the Bankruptcy Court.
23	The first subpoena was served in July of 2013,
24	July 10th. Comcast responded.
25	Because of the information requested Comcast has



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an obligation under 47 U.S.C. Section 551(c)(2)(B) and (H) to let subscribers know that certain information has been requested by another party, and to give them an opportunity to object.

And Comcast takes that duty very seriously, and has complied with that with regard to two out of the three subpoenas. I do not know whether the third subpoena served on July -- on August 8th they did that or not, because in the intervening time, the actual Plaintiff in the case had filed a motion for protective order and a motion to quash, and several other things, which Comcast sort of got sucked into.

During the process, there was a return date. We had contacted Mr. Chintella. And, Your Honor, I was not involved in the underlying case -- or the District Court case, Mr. Goldman was.

So, we contacted Mr. Chintella and told him that we would comply once we had gone through the necessary Statutory compliance regarding notification. Once we had done that, we'd produce the items he asked for, and we produced those on August 2nd. I believe the return date on the subpoena was July 31st.

We proceeded to do the same thing for the second subpoena, but in the interim, he filed a motion for contempt. He did not get a motion compelling us to produce anything, and our notice period with regard to the subscribers had not



run in that case, and so we proceeded to basically say "we cannot produce this information without a court order," and he filed for contempt rather than ask for a court order asking us to produce it pursuant to the applicable Statute.

There was a third subpoena served, and, as I said, there was several motions for protective order and sanctions that went back and forth between the Plaintiff and Defendant, which I have not listed on here because that would just needlessly complicate things.

Essentially, the Court, Judge O'Kelley, issued an order in December saying that we were entirely justified in not responding to the subpoenas. And, as a result of that, we then filed a motion for attorneys' fees because this case ended up eating a lot more time than the normal search situation.

In the interim, between the date that the subpoenas were filed and the various motion practice on the protective orders and other issues, Mr. Chintella had filed for bankruptcy, Chapter 7.

We looked at the Court's order when it came out, which is docket number 100, that the Judge had addressed that, that he said it did not prevent him from ruling.

And so we proceeded. Because we proceeded, there was a gap in the Statute between Section -- or the Federal Rule 54 says that it does not apply to Section 1927 motions.



However, the Local Rule does not have that same language, and so based on the fact that the Local Rule did not have the same language, we went ahead and filed so we would not necessarily lose our right to do so.

In light of the language from the Court that the Court could proceed, we filed. And believe that we were able to file under the exception. We took a look at a variety of cases, including the Stano case, the Burr case, and the Alpern case, all of which are cited in our papers. I can go through those if the Court would like.

THE COURT: I'm familiar with those cases.

MR. ANDERSON: Okay.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ANDERSON: And, as a result of that, we proceeded. We offered Mr. Chintella an extension of time in which to respond if he believed that the stay applied. He was concerned about possibly waiving some rights, and went ahead and responded.

At that point, the District Court entered a new order, basically said that we would have to come to this Court and determine whether we were, in fact, exempt or that the stay applied, and where things stood there.

So the very next day, we filed a motion for relief from stay and annulment.

And I believe we filed on the 16th, and the Judge



entered his order on the 15th, I think it was. Or he filed on the 16th and we entered out -- entered his order on the 16th, we filed on the 17th, and then Mr. Chintella responded.

We believe that we do fall under the exception under the *Pastano* case and those cases that have analyzed the imposition of sanctions in ongoing court cases. I mean, the Bankruptcy Code in this case is not designed to protect a debtor from bad conduct in other litigation, and, as I said, we firmly believe that we're correct on that.

I would also mention, because we did not put it in our papers, that <code>Hadid v. Alhagalan</code> (ph) case, which is out of the Eastern District of Virginia, where they talk about motions for sanctions against a defendant-debtor, are not stayed based on 362(a). And courts have generally accepted this interpretation, and then it goes on to list <code>Alpern</code>, <code>Berg</code>, the <code>Martin v. Todd</code> case, and a variety of other cases.

And the cite to that case is 2000 U.S.D.C. Lexis 2394. That is at asterisk 7.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ANDERSON: I can walk through the facts, but it sounds like Your Honor is somewhat familiar with them.

THE COURT: I have read the authorities that you all have cited. I've looked at the papers. So I really want to hear from Mr. Chintella, but then I have a couple of questions.



1 MR. ANDERSON: Okay, so you'd like to hear from 2 Mr. Chintella? THE COURT: Yes, please. 3 4 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. 5 THE COURT: Unless there's something you don't 6 have in your papers that you really think I need to know. 7 But I'm pretty familiar with what the argument is, and generally the time line for what happened. 8 9 MR. ANDERSON: All right, thank you, Your Honor. 10 MR. CHINTELLA: Good afternoon, Your Honor, my name is Blair Chintella. I'm here representing myself. 11 Just real quick, I wanted to clarify two things. 12 There has been some confusion in the District 13 14 Court docket. This has been a fairly drawn out and long case, and some of the motions, as you're aware, may be 15 confusing as having filed by the Plaintiff. 16 17 And in response to that, I have been confused 18 somewhat and my pleadings haven't been exactly clear. 19 But, it's my understanding that the motion that 20 they have filed only pertained to the August 8th subpoena. The motion that we filed -- that I filed on behalf of my 21 22 client was for the July 25th subpoena. 23 There have been four subpoenas served on Comcast 24 in this case, and I listed them in my paperwork. 25 7/10 subpoena, a 7/15 subpoena, a 7/25 subpoena, and a 8/8



2700 Centennial Tower 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, GA 30303 subpoena. Those are the service dates of the subpoenas.

So, the sanctions motion we filed only -- has attached to it the 7/25 subpoena, and the motion for protective order that was filed by AF Holdings only had attached to it the 8/8 subpoena.

So, I've had multiple conversations with an attorney named Monica Mosley, who I understand is a Pennsylvania attorney, and I have explained to her on the phone that it was our understanding that Plaintiff's motion only pertained to the 8/8 subpoena. So that's why we filed a motion for the 7/25 subpoena.

We were under an extremely tight deadline. We had two months of discovery. If you've read about this case, the substance of it, we're dealing with people who are hiding assets, a lot of shell companies. We tried to serve one of the people down in Florida, but the house is vacant, the water is shut off.

So we're trying to track down these people, so it was crucial to get this information in the case, to try and find out the addresses, so we can get a deposition, serve a subpoena on these players who are responsible for this huge case.

THE COURT: And you understand I'm not ruling on the sanctions motion?

MR. CHINTELLA: Sure, sure.



THE COURT: All I'm concerned with is whether the
1927 motion that was filed is within the 362(b)(4) exception.
That's all I'm dealing with today.

So, while I appreciate that there may be confusion about what subpoena was being dealt with, --

MR. CHINTELLA: Right.

THE COURT: -- to the extent that the 1927 motion is heard at some point, Judge O'Kelley is going to hear that, not this Court.

MR. CHINTELLA: Right.

THE COURT: So, let's address the stay issue here, if you would, please.

MR. CHINTELLA: Right, right. I just -- if the relief is somehow connected with my intentions, that's the only reason I was mentioning that, because one of the factors that courts discuss is annulment of stay is bad faith of the debtor. So that's why I was discussing that, Your Honor.

But, you know, I do understand there are two issues. One is whether the stay even applies, or whether their motion is an exception to it, and whether annulment is warranted here.

On the first issue, you know, as we cite in our briefs, you know, the exception that they're seeking to use is for police and regulatory power.

And I'm going to start off by saying that, you



know, exceptions are supposed to be narrowly construed, and the police or regulatory power in the cases we cite, you can see it's aimed at like the general health and welfare of the public at large.

So, you know, actions are injunctions under the Fair Labor Standards Act, are included in -- I don't need to repeat exactly what is written in the memorandum, but that's the general gist of our argument.

THE COURT: So the general gist of your argument is that the (b)(4) exception doesn't apply to preserving and protecting the judicial process from abusive litigation or sanctionable conduct? Is that the argument?

MR. CHINTELLA: No, Your Honor. I guess we would -- we're not -- I wouldn't sit here and say that that's not a public policy concern, I guess, or a way to -- you know, because the Statute is aimed at curbing or effectuating some policy, but so is everything else. Every other rule out there.

There are cases that, you know, we cited, where there is a law that has been violated, but the Court distinguishes that violation from one that is aimed at police and regulatory function of the Courts -- or, excuse me, of the exception, which goes broadly to general public welfare.

When you look at Section 28 U.S.C. 1927, you know, true, it does have ancillary effect of that, but the primary



purpose, you know, is to give the party, you know, compensation, you know, for their work. It's strictly tied to the number of hours, the excess costs created by the action.

(Brief pause)

MR. CHINTELLA: Your Honor, and in the case that we -- I didn't get a chance to cite, you know, rushing to draft these things, is *Brock v. Rusco Industries, Inc.* It's an 11th Circuit case, 842 F. 2d 270.

And there, you know, it cites Congressional policy, and it gives an example. It says "consequently, Congress permitted a suit by the government 'to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws.'"

So, here, the Secretary brought the suit to protect legitimate business from unfair competition and to force the federal law regarding minimum wage.

THE COURT: How does this --

MR. CHINTELLA: The Court in that case sought -- the secretary sought damages, just an injunction.

THE COURT: All right. I did look at your pleading. I will say I didn't see that -- the argument that you're making to me today, which is that the primary purpose of this Statute is pecuniary as to the individual, and that this -- the sanctions motion is not the type of police and



regulatory power that (b)(4) goes to.

So, if you have other cases you want to cite to me for that, I'm happy to look at them. But I will tell you that the question I really have, and I want you to address, is --

MR. CHINTELLA: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: -- if you look at the *Alpern* opinion, which is a Seventh Circuit opinion, or the *Berg* opinion, which is a Ninth Circuit opinion, which obviously isn't binding on this Court, but is persuasive authority.

Those deal with Rule 11 sanctions, deal with discovery sanctions. How do you distinguish the type of sanctions that are sought under 1927 from the Rule 11 or the discovery sanctions? Aren't they the same thing?

MR. CHINTELLA: I guess, no, I wouldn't argue that all sanctions are created equal. There are a variety of policies behind different types of sanctions. Now it's, you know, it's not really an issue in this case, but I would argue that even different types of sanctions under Rule 11 might be treated differently for purposes of the exception.

And Rule 11 provides a variety of sanctions, you know, they can be customized, they can be monetary, they could be fine. You know, they could have been initiated by the Movant, or they could have been initiated sua sponte, which might change the effect under the exception.



Whether it's really aimed at vindicating the Court's authority is significantly different than if it's just pecuniarily to compensate somebody, you know.

You know, sanctions under 1927, the only sanctions that can be imposed are payment of money to the moving party. You know, indirectly, every type of sanction is going to have some policy or reasoning behind it, and so I guess I would ask the Court to draw that distinction, you know, with Section 1927.

Other cases we cite -- or I cite in the brief, you know, even contempt sanctions under certain circumstances are stayed, or are not excepted from the automatic stay.

So, in those cases, you know, I cite, you can look at whether it's truly a police or regulatory matter, you know, public health, welfare, environmental protection, Fair Labor Standards Act, and those kinds of things, versus, you know, although it's a coercive sanction, you know, or a -- you know, a contempt sanction to compensate, you know, courts have, you know, drawn that distinction even in the context of just under Rule 11 specifically.

THE COURT: Do you have cites for me in which courts discuss the different purposes of Rule 11 and distinguish them -- some that might be a (b)(4) action and some that might not?

(Brief pause)



cites a multitude of cases. That's 20 B.R. 997.

MR. CHINTELLA: The only case we cite is the Donovan case, and that -- it's a Northern District of Georgia case, and that touches on just the broad -- how to interpret, essentially, police or regulatory powers. And that case

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHINTELLA: It's cites, you know, cases, you know, the CFTC is able to access a debtor's books. That was not -- or that was an exception to the stay. SEC trying to obtain an injunction, cites a Fifth Circuit case on page 1002 of that case.

You know, honestly, I did spend a lot of time trying to research these issues, because, you know, it takes time away from, you know, trying to find work and rehabilitate. But, you know, there's not a lot of -- I didn't find a lot of case law out there drawing that distinction just in the context of Rule 11, but I did find cases, you know, drawing that distinction, I guess, as far as different types of sanctions, so it focuses more on the minute, you know, specific rule.

THE COURT: Which specific distinction are you speaking about, drawing what distinction?

MR. CHINTELLA: Oh, the *Jove* case is one. That case involves an order under Section 105. Footnote 4, the Court says "criminal contempt sanctions are punitive in



1	nature and are imposed to vindicate the authority of the
2	Court. On the other hand, sanctions in civil contempt
3	proceedings may be employed for either or both of two
4	reasons, to coerce the defendant or to compensate.
5	And the last part was a paraphrase.
6	THE COURT: So, it's your contention that 1927
7	sanctions are purely for compensation, they are not for
8	coercive purposes? Is that the argument you're making?
9	MR. CHINTELLA: No. I believe that there is
10	authority in this Circuit saying that, you know, there is a
11	punitive aspect of those sanctions.
12	However, punitive, we would not or I would not
13	equate with police and regulatory power. That's the
14	distinction I would draw on that point, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: Okay.
16	MR. CHINTELLA: You know, there's another case
17	here.
18	(Brief pause)
19	MR. CHINTELLA: If it's all right, Your Honor, I'd
20	like to I can continue searching, but maybe hear a
21	response and then I can find that case for you.
22	THE COURT: Okay, that would be fine.
23	(Brief pause)
24	MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, you said you might have



some questions?

25

THE COURT: That's really my big question: What do the cases you all have cited, I've looked at other Eleventh Circuit authority that discusses the nature of sanctions, including the Amlong case at 500 F. 3d 1230, in which, at footnote 1, the majority talks about the dissent having cited a case having to do with Rule 11 sanctions, and the majority then contrasts that with 1927 sanctions.

And what they said, and I think what I'm going to end up doing, is giving you folks a few days to give me additional briefs on the particular distinction that counsel is trying to draw. But I want to read to you where I'm coming from in terms of my analysis of the sanctions and why, at least unless you can show me some other authority, I don't see where there's a distinction that would take this outside of the (b)(4) scenario.

That footnote says: "While many of the same general principles apply to sanctions under Rule 11 and sanctions under 1927, Rule 11 and 1927 are distinct sources of authority. Rule 11 permits attorneys' fees for conduct which merely fails to meet a reasonableness standard in contrast to a court's inherent powers, which require a higher showing. It's clear that negligent conduct standing alone will not support a finding of bad faith under Section 1927. 1927 is not a catch-all provision for sanction and objectionable conduct by counsel. For sanctions under 1927



to be appropriate, something more than a lack of merit is required. The Statute was designed to sanction attorneys who willfully abuse the judicial process by conduct tantamount to bad faith. Bad faith is the touchstone. Section 1927 is not about mere negligence."

So, to me, that draws a distinction that says that 1927 sanctions are even more strictly construed and are even — go even more to protecting the judicial process, because they are akin to the inherent authority of the court, which, to me, says that they would absolutely be within the exception of (b)(4), which has been held by the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit to provide an exception to allow the courts to protect the judicial process against foul manner of litigation tactics that are detrimental to that process.

But, I want to give you the opportunity to respond to that, and cite me cases or make arguments that would indicate that that's an incorrect reading, because I did not see -- neither party cited, nor did I see, a case that directly addresses this issue. So, I do want you all to have a complete and full opportunity to make whatever arguments you want to make.

But that's really from reading what has been filed and from doing a little additional research. Where I think the issue is, is how is there really a principle distinction between 1927 and Rule 11, or Appellate Rule 38, or the other



types of Rules where courts have found that (b)(4) does apply.

Now, that doesn't say that if, hypothetically, I say it's a (b)(4) exception, you can go back, Judge O'Kelley can enter whatever order he thinks is appropriate. That doesn't mean that that is then collectible, that money judgment, because (b)(4) also says that it's only as to other than money judgments.

And the Second Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have both confirmed that the Code says what it means, which is you can get the judgment, but you can't go any further than that without coming back to this Court.

So, if this is a (b)(4) exception, the motion could go forward. But any type of enforcement or collection action would have to come back to this Court and consider how that affects the bankruptcy case.

MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, we were aware of that.

THE COURT: I'm just -- I want to set forth for everybody what I'm thinking, because I do want you all to go back in, say, about 10 days give me any relevant authority you think that addresses this particular issue.

And it may be that you come back and you tell me "we didn't really find cases that talk much about how they're different, how they're alike." But I want to give you -- give particularly the Debtor the opportunity to fully brief



the issue that I think is the one that matters.

And I've read the papers, I know all about the automatic stay being a breathing spell. It is clearly fundamental to bankruptcy, but in this particular case and this scenario, I think the issue is how or is there a way to distinguish 1927 sanctions from sanctions that Appellate Courts have already said are such that they fall within that exception.

MR. CHINTELLA: [indecipherable - not near microphone].

THE COURT: That's what you need to do, because the ones that I have looked at that deal with sanctions and protecting the judicial process, I'm not talking about EEOC, I'm not talking about environmental clean-up, I'm talking about sanctions in litigation to protect the court process, with the exception of one case cited in the Berg case.

I'm not aware of any cases that go the other way, but if they're there, I would love for you to present them to the Court so that I can read both sides of the issue.

MR. CHINTELLA: Your Honor, so, if I understand correctly, you would like us to file a supplemental brief within 10 days of today, so that would be the 14th, which I think is next Friday?

THE COURT: That is next Friday.

MR. CHINTELLA: Okay.



MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, I apologize for intruding. Would the Court -- would it make more sense to the Court to have the Debtor file a brief so that -- because I know that we have looked into this very issue that the Court is raising, and --

THE COURT: And if you all don't want to file anything supplemental, that's fine. If you think you've given me everything that is relevant, then I'm happy to leave it at that. I'm giving both sides the opportunity, and particularly I want to give Mr. Chintella the opportunity to address this particular issue.

Now, you may then want to have a reply.

MR. ANDERSON: That's what I was thinking, that it might make more sense, because I know we've -- this is a discussion that, you know, we had in filing the brief that we filed.

But, and there's certainly -- I guess there's another layer of research we can lay on top of what we've already done and look to see if there is some authority that would be helpful to the Court.

But I was thinking that perhaps, because Mr.

Chintella had said that, you know, he thinks he's got some cases, perhaps we can, you know, flush those out and give us a chance to respond.

So maybe five days for him and five days later for



us, or something like that, would be useful.

MR. CHINTELLA: Your Honor, I'm not willing to agree to that, but I'll do what the Court orders. I'm not going to give him [indecipherable - not near microphone]. If they want to frame it that way and [indecipherable] I'd be okay with that, Your Honor. Both parties due in 10 days.

MR. ANDERSON: You know, I really don't care what we do, I'm just trying to make it easy for everybody. It doesn't make a bit of difference to me.

THE COURT: And I appreciate that. Both sides have the opportunity to brief that issue, whether you do it is up to both sides. I told you where my thinking is. You kind of generally know what the Court thinks at this point.

I want to give both sides the opportunity to present me to authority that I haven't yet seen, or perhaps there are arguments that I haven't considered in conjunction with how do you distinguish this particular type of sanctions. I'm going to give you both that opportunity, 10 days.

If one side doesn't file anything, I'll rely on what has already been filed.

MR. ANDERSON: So, Your Honor, it will be due Friday the 14th?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ANDERSON: Okay. All right. Do you want us



to have it set back down for another hearing?

THE COURT: No, what I want to do is I want to look at what is submitted in writing, and if I think a further hearing will be useful, I'll set that.

MR. ANDERSON: Since the Court is asking for some additional briefing in this case, could we ask that any deadlines be stayed, because Mr. Chintella has also filed a motion for sanctions for --

THE COURT: And there -- generally with the -- MR. CHINTELLA: [indecipherable - not near microphone].

THE COURT: Generally with the motion for sanctions in the main case, unless the Local Rules specifically require a reply, we generally don't require a written reply. But it does not make sense to deal with that until after this threshold issue is addressed, because if it is a (b)(4) issue, I think that resolves the motion for sanctions.

MR. CHINTELLA: Your Honor as far as the [indecipherable] hearing, we would ask that -- can I ask that that would be stayed. Any initiation of -- my thought behind that is that it may form or, I guess, alter Comcast's cases that there is, in fact, a viable motion of the rule for violation of stay potentially going out there, I mean, in that case. It was sort of a -- I believe that is transpired



stay violation.

in an order, just to save everybody some time and -especially, I guess, because, you know, every time I'm
working on something in this matter, is time that we
[indecipherable].

THE COURT: Has an answer been filed in that?

MR. CHINTELLA: I filed a motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHINTELLA: You know, they are, I guess,
obligated to respond, so I'm okay with granting an extension
of that until we resolve this.

But I don't know, maybe Comcast can say whether
it's still proceeding with that despite a viable motion for

THE COURT: So, isn't the adversary a dischargeability action?

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor, it is.

THE COURT: Okay. And is it based on -- is it to preserve any rights with respect to the 1927 motion? Is that what it was? Frankly, I have not read the complaint. I know there is an adversary, but I have not read the complaint.

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor, to the extent that we received any award, the way we read the Rules, we had to go ahead and file the dischargeability sooner rather than later because of where things are in the bankruptcy.

THE COURT: Right.



MR. ANDERSON: But if that -- if the Court is going to stay that, because we understand that if Judge O'Kelley were to make an award, we'd be back here in front of Your Honor, we would agree to stay those things.

I know that he's filed a motion to dismiss the

I know that he's filed a motion to dismiss the non-dischargeability.

THE COURT: Okay. And, to me, it makes sense to stay the matter. First of all, I understand why you filed when you filed, because there is a deadline.

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But, at this point, there hasn't been any adjudication. There are other moving parts, so let's do this: Let's stay the -- any proceedings in the adversary proceeding, which would include any requirement to respond to the motion to dismiss until -- I'm thinking 30 days after ruling on the motion for relief and the motion -- the willful violation motion.

Does that all sound workable to everybody?

MR. CHINTELLA: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. And then in the actual bankruptcy case?

THE COURT: That's the willful violation motion, is the sanctions motion. And that, I believe, is going to rise or fall on the ruling that is currently under consideration.



It could fall, but whether it MR. ANDERSON: rises, I guess that --

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THE COURT: That would be correct. Yes. Chintella, did you want to say something?

MR. CHINTELLA: Just that I hope that I won't I think that's just the way I would respond to that. fall.

I think I'm more than happy to -- so far as the three motions, just strictly to the issue, that one issue which I also will give additional information as part of the annulment. How would the Court like me to visit that? That's two issues, I quess.

THE COURT: Right. I think that I really just want you to focus on the issue of the nature of the sanction and how it would be distinguishable.

And if I then end up agreeing with you, if we need to come back and take evidence as to whether an annulment is appropriate or not, we can get there. But I think this is really the threshold legal issue, in my mind, and it doesn't make sense to have an evidentiary hearing if it's going to be resolved on a legal issue.

> MR. CHINTELLA: Fine.

THE COURT: All right, so we will enter an order in the adversary staying the proceeding until 30 days after a ruling on this motion and the sanctions motion.

And you all will present within 10 days, by March





